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Abstract. Collaboration requires that information can be shared, transformed 
and reconciled across differing representations. Communication needs structure 
and control, but needs also to stimulate creativity and diversity. This continual 
tension was pointed out by Bakhtin. Formal representation systems face the 
same issue, being continually subverted as differing ontologies are brought into 
contact, and often conflict. Examples relating to construction, learning and 
graphical communication illustrate the generality of these issues. Potential ways 
are emerging to address, and even to derive benefits from, the clash of 
ontologies. 
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1   Communication and subversion 
Increasingly we face the need to collaborate around resources. This seems to be an 
inevitable focus in many different contexts. In learning, students need to be offered, 
and to share, discuss and transform, a wide range of resources of many different 
types. In the workplace — for instance, the construction industry — information is 
collected in many places, in many forms, and people need to access, discuss, abstract 
and augment this information in a huge variety of ways. Often the “semantic web” 
raises issues concerned with seeking unknown resources; but often, also, it can be 
about finding and supporting diverse ways to work with resources about which much 
is already known. 
The focus in these sorts of cases falls on communication, and on how it can be 
structured. There are competing objectives, in many instances, even where there may 
not appear to be at first sight. In particular, one objective may be to facilitate the 
effective use of the resources, to automate various ancillary functionalities, and hence 
to control the structure and content of communication; whereas another objective may 
be to enhance creativity, foster emergent viewpoints, and encourage diversity of 
interpretation. The latter kinds of objectives are especially likely in areas such as 
design and learning, of course; but wherever they arise, they are in tension with the 
former kinds.  
We see this kind of tension, for example, on the building site. In the construction 
industry, as discussed elsewhere [7], there is a natural inclination to suppose that 
overarching standardisation and automation will be helpful in improving the 
efficiency and accuracy of communication, and in enforcing compliance with various 
standards, codes, regulations and legislation. However, these goals are subverted by 
the fact that in detail all building sites are different, and by the relentless tendency of 
groups to evolve their own conventions for interpretation, usage and practice. 
Moreover this subversion is commonly in fact desirable because it helps to 
accommodate local difficulties that are unforeseen by, and perhaps incommensurable 
with, the formal schemata of the documentation. Subversion is ultimately necessary to 
allow creative responses, innovation and development at both local levels and more 
generally. It is crucial for designers, whose stock in trade is to challenge and extend 
accepted notions of the limitations and even definitions of common concepts [12].  
The importance of subversion is often overlooked in contexts such as construction. 
There is a tendency to assume that things can be defined, and once defined fixed, and 
that order and regularity can be imposed. The illusory nature of such assumptions is 
of course well recognised in many other contexts and traditions. Bakhtin is famous for 
having celebrated the notion of "Carnival" as an emblem of that which cannot be 
regulated in interaction. This might be envisaged as an occasional outbreak of 
mayhem, but he sought to distinguish it from transient spectacle. Rather he alludes to 
an ongoing process of subversion in which “a juxtaposition of marginalised and 
official discourses” [15] is central — a process that from his point of view is part and 
parcel of the notion of all human communication as "heteroglossia": a polyphony of 
voices vying to establish temporary dominance, or perhaps even consensus, but 
destined inevitably to continued dialectical struggle. And this struggle, as we have 
observed, guarantees that the door is always slightly ajar to innovation and creativity. 
The price of too much order is sterility: examples are legion. If we reflect, we know 
that periodic revolution establishing fresh standards and then a renewed period of 
sterility is also ultimately less fruitful, albeit perhaps temporarily more peaceful and 
less confusing, than a broad consensus that is nonetheless incessantly transformed by 
continual carnival underneath. 
The point of this in the current context is that the representation of the structure of 
a domain, of communicational content — of meaning — is not something that can be 
fixed. It needs to be susceptible of continual negotiation. Where we define formal 
systems that support these representations, we need also to define systems and 
processes that can support their renegotiation. 
2   Representation and mismatch 
It’s therefore possible to suggest [7] that an important role for the formal 
characterisation of communication is in identifying areas where there is mismatch in 
understandings, tension and conflict, and in pinning down the nature of the 
disagreement. Similarly to systems that try to enforce standardisation, the formal 
framework may be based on a defined ontology for the domain; but now it is seen as a 
temporary and local snapshot of a conceptualisation that needs to be reconciled with 
others, offering terms in which concepts can be seen to differ while their relationships 
can also be captured. It affords, moreover, a hook on which to hang an account of 
reasoning and argumentation that arises around resolving the issue. 
An idea rather like this has been studied in the context of the semantic web by 
McNeill et al. [8]. Their idea is that agents who come into dialogue about some 
specific issue — say, a flight booking — will commonly find that their definitions of 
some key terms in the interaction will differ slightly. In other words, they will have 
slightly different ontologies underlying their representations of the domain in 
question. A formal characterisation of the ontology is provided, in which the 
characterisation of types of component entities and relations (the signature) is 
distinguished from the basic information about instances of these in a given situation, 
and rules describing possible actions (the theory).  Situations are considered in which 
interacting agents are developing a plan, e.g. of the actions required to book tickets, 
and at some point a failure is encountered. The reason for the failure can be 
interactively identified by the agents as some specific mismatch between their 
ontologies, in either signature or theory. A procedure can then be defined that will 
refine one of them in order to remove the problem. It’s noted that this procedure in 
general is restricted to dealing with situations where the ontologies are on the whole 
quite similar and the discrepancies therefore minor. In many more complex (and 
perhaps realistic) cases it will be difficult to provide algorithmic approaches to 
resolution. Bundy and McNeill [1] propose that developing more flexible ways to 
resolve such issues by changing an ontology’s underlying syntax and semantics is one 
of the grand challenges facing research in artificial intelligence: “Understanding and 
implementing this ability must be a major focus of AI for the next 50 years.” (87)  But 
in the meantime, even if the resolution can’t be automated and has to be pursued by 
human agents, the identification of the point of conflict, and assisting the recording of 
the rationale for whatever resolution is achieved along with the nature of that 
resolution, may be highly valuable. 
The notion of capturing “design rationale” for various purposes is well established 
in the design research literature, and sometimes practice. Commonly this has been 
related to argumentation systems, which also often produce an emphasis on dialectical 
processes intended to expose and resolve disagreements [3, 2]. Usually the focus is on 
capturing the reasons for particular design decisions. It’s therefore a very general 
notion that can emerge differently in a variety of contexts. Here we simply note that 
grounding rationale, where appropriate, in a framework of ontological representation 
and change may be an effective way to develop its use. In practice, capturing rationale 
has often been found difficult, to some extent because of problems with creating a 
clear representation of the context, the starting point of the decision issue, and then 
relating the rationale clearly to this. If we anchor the rationale within the kind of 
process that McNeill et al. [8] suggest, then it may have a much clearer and more 
effective starting point. 
Most of the discussion around these ontology-matching processes naturally enough 
arises in contexts where ontologies already exist in a more or less explicit form. In 
other situations, however, there may be none, or there may be only a rudimentary 
ontology, or one in the process of forming, and these processes may have a role in 
developing the ontology more fully. Such situations arise especially where ontologies 
are “crowd-sourced” or based on “folksonomies”. Here there is often some kind of 
resource for which metadata is required and has to be built up or added to gradually 
through an activity, perhaps of an online community. For instance, Microsoft offer 
“Windows Azure”, intended to assist Open Government by supporting access to data 
with a system called “DataMarket”: 
as [citizens or developers] combine different concepts, they are actually 
recommending new relationships within the data ecosystem. Every interaction 
actually helps crowd-source changes to the ontology, which in turn makes 
every future interaction more powerful and relevant. [10] 
This can work, up to a point, but only in so far as the people combining the 
concepts somehow recognise and agree on what the concepts are. Sooner or later, 
there will be discrepancies, and then some matching process will be needed that can 
actually reconcile the existing ontology with proposed changes. On the face of it, 
systems like this are likely to support a monotonic process of accretion around an 
ontology that in itself is retained; and therefore additions that are in some sense 
inconsistent with the existing material are likely to be rejected. In general terms, 
something more flexible is needed, that can potentially accommodate in both 
directions. 
3   An example: learning 
Another example of a case like this is where we have data, such as video, that has rich 
content but little explicit representation of it. We are starting to develop automated 
means of analysing these kinds of data, but there is a long way to go. In the interim, it 
makes sense to involve communities of users in creating and improving metadata. A 
pilot project in Edinburgh has been developing a system for learners, in which 
learning materials are offered in the form of rich media that can be manipulated and 
annotated. Known as “YouTute”, the approach is based on videos of tutorial 
discussions that occur in ordinary tutorial groups, where typically 5-10 students will 
discuss a series of problems with a tutor. We collect naturally occurring tutorial 
dialogues as unedited video. Three streams are collected per tutorial (two from 
cameras, one from a “Smartboard” that captures anything written on it during the 
activity). These are later played in synchrony via a web-based interface that allows 
students to review the material and “edit” it by identifying segments that are of 
interest. These segments (which we call “tutes”) can be named, tagged, annotated and 
shared with other students. Students are able to see texts of relevant lecture slides, and 
the questions being discussed in the tutorial. The system has been deployed on several 
courses, is well received by students and seems to have worked especially well as a 
revision aid [11, 6]. A screenshot of the system in use appears in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  YouTute interface 
The process of editing the videos and selecting “good” dialogues is a shared activity, 
the responsibility of the students. It is a form of “social networking”, through which a 
community of students can emerge as learners who collaborate to create a new 
learning resource. This shared activity is also itself a learning activity, promoting 
reflection on the topics discussed, and re-evaluation of the original tutorial discussion. 
In the present context, the significance of this approach is that the learners will in 
the long run have to develop their own ideas about what constitutes interesting 
learning material, how it is organised, what are its constituent parts, how its various 
categories relate. Which is to say that they will have to evolve an ontology of learning 
materials, related probably also to the domain about which they are learning (in our 
cases so far, theoretical aspects of computer science). At present, all of this is implicit: 
the learners use only unstructured tags and free text, but in further development of the 
system a clearer ontology would certainly be required and desired, to facilitate 
organisation, search and use of the information. This ontology needs to be negotiated, 
and continuingly negotiable, as new learners enter the community, new topics are 
addressed, new ways of organising the material devised. However, there is a further 
wrinkle: we intend also that learners would be able to link other materials into the 
resource being constructed, e.g. other lectures found on the internet, pieces of video 
from broadcasters’ archive sites, documents and notes from a variety of sources. 
Whatever these things are, their content will need to be related to the existing 
material, but they will come with their own metadata, based on a variety of other 
ontologies. Once again we face the ontology matching problem. 
Again the message is that no amount of standardisation, e.g. exploitation of Dublin 
core or other schemata, will overcome this problem. But in fact it should not be seen 
as a problem — rather, it is an opportunity, to address the challenge and devise good 
approaches that will offer real flexibility combined with powerful support.  
4   An example: graphical communication 
In some respects, this discussion about ontologies can be seen as similar to certain 
aspects of reasoning by analogy, or using modalities such as graphics in reasoning. In 
analogical reasoning, one has to develop a mapping between structures, e.g. the 
“structure-mapping” approach of Gentner [5, 4]. There is a domain to be reasoned 
about, for instance the structure of atoms, and one finds a domain with relatable 
structure, e.g. the solar system, and uses the latter to reason about the former. Where 
there is analogy, of course, there is also disanalogy: one has to select specific 
elements of the two domains that will be related, disregarding others completely, and 
generally allowing that there will be some looseness of fit even between those that are 
used. Similarly in reasoning with graphics: Wang, with colleagues including the 
present author [13, 14], discussed some time ago a system at least superficially related 
at a formal level to the technique adopted by McNeill et al. [9], in which domains are 
represented algebraically as a signature of types of element, accompanied by a more 
specific theory. One domain, of course, is the graphical domain, in which objects such 
as perhaps lines and circles can be represented as being in various geometrical 
relationships. The other is whatever domain is to be depicted: once this is represented 
in a similar manner, a “signature morphism” (i.e. a structure mapping) can be defined 
that shows how various elements are depicted and e.g. what operations on the 
depiction are meaningful. Thus, for instance, one can give a clear semantic account of 
how Euler circle diagrams can be used to reason about the relationships between sets 
in general, or specific sets of particular things; or of how a certain sort of diagram can 
be used to depict both the atom and the solar system. 
It would certainly be desirable for collaborative work to be supported by these 
kinds of representations. Collaborators will naturally want to introduce new entities 
into the activity, and manipulate the ones that are already there. In this context, 
accommodating something as yet undepicted into a given representation (system) is 
like the process of accommodating it to a given ontology. In one sense, the ontologies 
of the graphical system and the depicted domain are very different, but under the 
morphism they are very close, if not identical. However, in the practical use of this 
kind of representation system, as in any other, there will always be change: changing 
contexts, purposes, user communities, etc. We want the mapping to subserve a 
purpose — the support of some argument or line of reasoning — and it may well 
happen, perhaps it will inevitably happen, that to subserve we must subvert, in the 
sense of changing the mapping to adjust its fit to differing and developing 
understandings of the domain and/or the reasoning process. 
5   Conclusion 
The point of these reflections has been to emphasise that the issues of flexibility and 
accommodation in formal systems are extremely general. Wherever communication 
happens, we need to support appropriate models of use. If Bakhtin, among many 
others, has alerted us to the ubiquitous nature of subversion, the ceaselessly 
carnivalesque nature of communication, we have also seen how this emerges in a 
variety of apparently quite formalised frameworks. It is not yet at all clear how in 
general to approach resolutions, but we have noted that there are moves and pointers 
in encouraging directions. In general we concur with Bundy and McNeill [1] in 
identifying this as a key issue for further research. 
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